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CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY OF PHYSICIANS:
THE INTERFACE OF TORT AND CONTRACT
INTRODUCTION
Contract actions are the last resort for victims of improper
medical care, perhaps because the remedies for breach, are slight
compared to the recoveries available under malpractice claims.
Few medical contract cases have been reported in the last fifty
years,' yet these cases are worthy of attention. They represent an
excellent example of the interface of tort and contract, and at least
one case has exposed not only the tension created by this overlap,
but also the problems inherent in classic contract formation.2
Historically, the medical contract action developed from
ignorance, either of the availability of malpractice actions, or of
the existence of claims until after tort actions were barred.3
Contract has always provided a longer statute of limitations period
1. See, e.g., Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967); Cole-
man v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8 (Del. Super. Ct. 1975); Zostautois v. St. Anthony De Padua
Hosp., 23 Ill. 2d 326, 178 N.E.2d 303 (1961); Rogala v. Silva, 16 Ill. App. 3d 63, 305 N.E.2d
571 (1973); Doerr v. Villate, 74 IlL. App. 2d 332, 220 N.E.2d 767 (1967); Gault v. Sideman,
42 Ill. App. 2d 96, 191 N.E.2d 436 (1963); Malone v. University of Kan. Medical Center,
220 Kan. 371, 552 P.2d 885 (1976); Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md. 432, 379 A.2d 1014 (1977); Sulli-
van v. O'Connor, 363 Mass. 579, 296 N.E.2d 183 (1973); Guilmet v. Campbell, 385 Mich.
57, 188 N.W.2d 601 (1971); Stewart v. Rudner, 349 Mich. 459, 84 N.W.2d 816 (1957);
Cloutier v. Kasheta, 105 N.H. 262, 197 A.2d 627 (1964); Lakeman v. LaFrance, 102 N.H.
300, 156 A.2d 123 (1959); McQuaid v. Michou, 85 N.H. 299, 157 A. 881 (1932); Hawkins v.
McGee, 84 N.H. 114, 146 A. 641 (1929); Robins v. Finestone, 308 N.Y. 543, 127 N.E.2d 330
(1955); Colvin v. Smith, 276 Al). 9, 92 N.Y.S.2d 794 (1949); Safian v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.,
260 A.D. 765, 24 N.Y.S.2d 92 (1940); Hirsch v. Safian, 257 A.). 212, 12 N.Y.S.2d 568 (1939);
Keating v. Perkins, 250 A.D. 9, 293 N.Y.S. 197 (1937); Frank v. Maliniak, 232 AD). 278, 249
N.Y.S. 514 (1931); Conklin v. Draper, 229 A). 227, 241 N.Y.S. 529 (1930); Monahan v.
Devinny, 223 A). 547, 229 N.Y.S. 60 (1928); Horowitz v. Bogart, 218 A.D. 158, 217 N.Y.S.
881 (1926); Frankel v. Wolper, 181 Al). 485, 169 N.Y.S. 15 (1918); and Hurlburt v. Gillet,
96 Misc. 161, 161 N.YS. 994 (1916). (This is not a complete list of medical contract cases,
but it includes the most frequently cited decisions of this century.)
In recent years the total number of actions against physicians has increased dra-
matically. It should be noted, however, that almost all of these cases are brought in tort,
not contract. See Miller, The Contractual Liability of Physicians and Surgeons, 1953
WAsH. U.L.Q. 413. According to Miller, there is a general tendency to use the word mal-
practice as a generic term connoting "any action against a physician or surgeon .... How-
ever, the better and almost universal usage is to restrict 'malpractice' solely to cases
involving negligent or unskillful conduct." Id. at 413.
2. See Sullivan v. O'Connor, 363 Mass. 579, 296 N.E.2d 183 (1973).
3. Lillach, The Malpractice Statute of Limitations in New York and Other Jurisdic-
tions, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 339, 347-48 (1962).
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than tort,4 and in an effort to circumvent the shorter period,
plaintiffs often pled breach of contract, omitting allegations of
"lack of skill" or "negligence" and claiming instead "improper
performance of work."5 After initial reluctance to accept the theory
of medical contracts, courts came to recognize that two or more
causes of action could arise from the same wrong.6
The most famous medical contract case, Hawkins v. McGee,
applied the traditional expectation damage theory, holding that
the measure of damages from an improperly performed operation
is the difference in value between the promised condition and the
surgery's actual result. Inadequate because it ignored the patient's
physical and mental suffering, this remedy also required the jury
4. See id. at 361-63. In New York, for example, the contract statute of limitation
period is six years, N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 213 (McKinney 1976); the malpractice limita-
tions period is only two and one half years, N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 214-a (McKinney Supp.
1978).
5. Lillach, supra note 3, at 347.
6. See, e.g., Monahan v. Devinny, 223 A.D. 547, 229 N.Y.S. 60 (1928); Horowitz v.
Bogart, 218 A.D. 158, 217 N.YS. 881 (1926). In Horowitz, the doctor agreed to remove
the plaintiff's ulcer, but removed his appendix instead. Although the plaintiff suffered
severe pain and mental distress, he did not discover the improper treatment until after
the malpractice statute of limitations had expired. The court rejected the breach of con-
tract complaint, stating that the only cause of action arising from the improper execu-
tion of medical services was in tort. Two years later in Monahan, the defendant chiroprac-
tor's treatment paralyzed the plaintiff. Although the malpractice claim was barred, the
court suggested that it might permit a limited recovery under a breach of contract
action. It was not until Conklin v. Draper, 229 AlD. 227, 241 N.Y.S. 529 (1930), that New
York recognized medical contracts. In Conklin, the defendant removed the plaintiff's
appendix, but left a surgical forceps inside the patient's abdominal cavity. The forceps
was not discovered until four years later, and the malpractice statute of limitations period
had expired. The court explicitly overruled Horowitz, holding that actions in tort and
contract are separate and distinct. After Conklin, a patient could bring a timely action
for breach of contract regardless of the tort statute of limitations. The major difference
between the two causes of action became the recoverable damages.
Conklin preceded a series of medical contract cases that outlined the key distinction
between the two causes of action. See, e.g., Lakeman v. LaFrance, 102 N.H. 300, 156 A.2d
123 (1959); Robins v. Finestone, 308 N.Y. 543, 127 N.E.2d 330 (1955); Hirsch v. Safian, 257
A.D. 212, 12 N.Y.S.2d 568 (1939).
The relationship of physician and patient can give rise to two distinct causes of
action, one for improper treatment, another for failure of a promised result. The
two causes of action are dissimilar as to theory, proof and damages recoverable.
Malpractice is predicated upon the failure to exercise requisite medical skill and
is tortious in nature .... An action in contract is based upon a failure to per-
form a special agreement.
Lakeman v. LaFrance, 102 N.H. at 304-05, 156 A.2d at 127 (citations omitted).
7. 84 N.H. 114, 146 A. 641 (1929). Hawkins is traditionally studied by first year law
students, and is included in many contracts textbooks. See, e.g., L. FuLLF- & M. EISENERO,
BASIC CONTRACT LAW (3d ed. 1972); F. KESSLER &- G. GILMORE, CONTRACT CASES AND MA-
TERIALS (2d ed. 1970); I. MAcNEIL, CASES AND MATERIAL ON CONTRACT (1971).
[Vol. 28
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to determine the value of the hypothetically promised condition.
One commentator has called traditional contract damages "anoma-
lous and unsatisfactory" when applied to medical cases.
8
Recent developments in medical malpractice have increased
physicians' tort liability. Courts have preserved tort claims by re-
defining the limitations period, changing the accrual date from the
time of the negligent act to the date of its discovery.9 As a result,
much of the original need for the contract action has been
eliminated. Nonetheless, within the traditional doctrinal frame-
work, contract cases have expanded the scope of recovery by
enlarging the range of the patient's foreseeable injuries."°
A 1973 medical contract case, Sullivan v. O'Connor," held
that traditional contract damage remedies were inadequate when
surgery worsened a patient's condition. Alice Sullivan, seeking a
rhinoplasty, consulted a plastic surgeon, who agreed to shorten her
nose in a procedure requiring two operations. The surgery dis-
figured her nose, so the doctor operated again. The third operation
was also unsuccessful, and the doctor told her that additional
surgery would not improve her appearance. She sued for breach
8. Miller, supra note 1, at 424. According to Miller, traditional contract damages
were inadequate because the awards were designed only to place the plaintiff in as good
a position as he would have been in had the breaching party performed the contract. This
logic, appropriate where the injuries are commercially related, is inappropriate where
the harms are nonpecuniary.
9. See, e.g., Flanagan v. Mount Eden Gen. Hosp., 24 N.Y.2d 427, 248 N.E.2d 871, 301
N.Y.S.2d 23 (1969). The physician left a surgical clamp inside the patient's body that went
undiscovered until after the malpractice statute of limitations period had expired. The
New York Court of Appeals overruled Conklin, stating that the tort statute of limitations
should not begin to run until the foreign object reasonably could have been discovered
by the patient. Id. at 430-31, 248 N.E.2d at 872-73, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 26. Termed the "dis-
covery rule," this modification of Conklin is justified as striking a balance between fair-
ness to the patient and the elimination of stale claims. New York limits its discovery rule
to cases in which the physician leaves a foreign object inside the patient's body, while
other states have adopted broader discovery rules that do not begin the tolling of the
limitations period until the negligence is discovered, regardless of whether a foreign ob-
ject is involved. Id. at 431-32, 248 N.E.2d at 873-74, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 27. See, e.g., Stafford
v. Schultz, 42 Cal. 2d 767, 270 P.2d 1 (1954); Johnson v. Caldwell, 371 Mich. 368, 123
N.W.2d 785 (1963); Ayers v. Morgan, 397 Pa. 282, 154 A.2d 788 (1959).
10. See, e.g., Guilmet v. Campbell, 385 Mich. 57, 188 N.W.2d 601 (1971); Stewart v.
Rudner, 349 Mich. 459, 84 N.W.2d 816 (1957). In Guilmet, the doctor repeatedly assured
the patient that the treatment would successfully cure his condition. When the treat-
ment failed, the physician was held liable for all the foreseeable consequences. In
Stewart, the Michigan Supreme Court permitted the patient to recover damages for her
mental distress when the defendant physician failed to perform the agreed caesarian
section and the baby was stillborn. The court noted that distress was a foreseeable result
of the doctor's failure to perform the special operation. For a discussion of Stewart, see
text accompanying notes 80-82 infra.
11. 363 Mass. 579, 296 N.E.2d 183 (1973).
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of contract, alleging that he failed to enhance her beauty as
promised. 2 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court expanded
the usual contract recovery, holding that the plaintiff's damages
could include compensation for out-of-pocket costs, medical ex-
penses, effects of awareness of the disfigurement, and pain and
suffering from the third operation.' The court found the tradi-
tional expectancy remedy both too narrow to compensate for the
plaintiff's injuries and too difficult to estimate.
Sullivan has both practical and theoretical implications.
Practically, it extends contractual liability of physicians to include
awards for pain and suffering.'5 But the case is not likely to have
a dramatic impact on physicians' liability: most lawsuits for the
improper execution of medical services are timely brought in tort.'0
Sullivan is important, however, because the court refused to apply
12. Id. at 579-80, 296 N.E.2d at 184. The plaintiff also brought a second action in
tort, alleging that the doctor negligently performed the surgery. The jury returned a
verdict for the plaintiff on the contract claim, and for the doctor on the malpractice
cause of action.
The trial court instructed the jury that Sullivan was entitled to recover her out-of-
pocket expenses, costs flowing from the breach, and damages for pain and suffering from
the third operation. Both the defendant and the plaintiff appealed: the defendant claimed
that only the out-of-pocket costs were compensable; the plaintiff challenged the court's
failure to give instructions permitting awards for the difference in value between the
promised and actual condition of the nose and for pain and suffering from the first two
operations. Id. at 581, 296 N.E.2d at 185.
13. Id. at 589, 296 N.E.2d at 189. The court never had to decide whether Sullivan
should be compensated for pain and suffering from the first two operations. Before the
appellate arguments, the plaintiff waived her claim to damages for pain and suffering.
14. Id. at 586-89, 296 N.E.2d at 188-89.
15. Id. See also Note, Contractual Liability in Medical Malpractice-Sullivan v.
O'Connor, 24 DE PAUL L. REv. 212, 213 (1974). Sullivan represents a departure from the
traditional manner in which courts have applied tort and contract damages. Tort recover-
ies "are for personal injuries, including the pain and suffering which naturally flow from
the tortious act. In the contract action they are restricted to the payments made and to
the expenditures for nurses and medicines or other damages that flow from the breach."
Colvin v. Smith, 276 A.D. 9, 9-10, 92 N.Y.S.2d 794, 795 (1949).
16. In the last few years many states have modified contract proof requirements by
placing a heavier burden on the plaintiff. Underlying this trend is a desire to safeguard
the physician who makes statements assuring recovery, sometimes interpreted by the pa-
tient as establishing a warranty of treatment, though not intended by the physician to
have that effect. To maintain a successful cause of action for breach of a medical con-
tract in Delaware or Illinois, for example, the patient must show separate consideration
in addition to payment for the regular medical service. See, e.g., Coleman v. Garrison,
349 A.2d 8 (Del. Super. Ct. 1967); Rogala v. Silva, 16 I1. App. 3d 63, 305 N.E.2d 571
(1973). Michigan, in 1974, included medical contracts within its statute of frauds, re-
quiring "[a]n agreement, promise, contract, or warranty of cure relating to medical care
of treatment (to be) in writing and signed by the party charged." See MIcH. CowV. LAws
ANN. § 566.132 (g) (Supp. 1979). The practical effect of these requirements has been to
limit physicians' contractual liability. See Comment, An Analysis of State Legislative Re-
sponses to the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 1975 Du L.J. 1417.
Traditionally, the malpractice cause of action has a more rigorous proof requirement
than the breach of contract suit. A negligence claim requires the plaintiff to establish:
(Vol. 28
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the case law and theory of the classical contract model, predicated
on objective and formal rules. It recognized that in a medical
contract action, such as Hawkins, the classical model often yields
hollow results. Instead, the Sullivan court analyzed the nature of
the injury resulting from the breach and attempted to develop
a socially acceptable remedy by molding the damage theory to
meet the case's needs.
I. THE CLASSIC MODEL
Classic contract law developed from the writings and philos-
ophy of Christopher Columbus Langdell and Oliver Wendell
Holmes;' 8 it was later incorporated by Samuel Williston into the
first Restatement of Contracts.9 Langdell believed that the law
should be made into a science, consisting of precise rules and
(1) the existence of a standard of care, (2) a failure to conform to that standard, (3) dam-
ages, and (4) a causal connection between the breach of the standard and the damages.
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF Tm LAw OF TORTS § 30 (4th ed. 1971). The basis for medical
malpractice is the allegation that the physician failed to provide his services in accord-
ance with the current level of medical knowledge and skill. See, e.g., Hale v. State, 53
A.D.2d 1025, 386 N.Y.S.2d 151 (1976); Hirschberg v. State, 91 Misc. 2d 590, 398 N.Y.S.2d
470 (1977).
[Miedical malpractice theory is based upon three component duties which a
physician owes to his patient, i.e., (1) a duty to possess the requisite knowledge
and skill such as is possessed by the average member of the medical profession;
(2) a duty to exercise ordinary and reasonable care in the application of such
professional knowledge and skill; and (3) the duty to use his best judgment in
the application of this knowledge and skill.
53 A.D.2d at 1025, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 152 (citation omitted).
In contrast to the tort action, a breach of contract requires the plaintiff to demon-
strate: (1) words or conduct illustrating a promise to provide a cure or special treatment,
(2) a failure to abide by the agreement's terms, and (3) damages resulting from the
breach. Salem Orthopedic Surgeons, Inc. v. Quinn, 79 Mass. Adv. Sh. 661, 386 N.E.2d 1268
(1979); Robins v. Finestone, 308 N.Y. 543, 127 N.E.2d 330 (1955). Breach of contract does
not require a showing of improper execution of medical services, only proof of failure
to achieve the promised results. The court noted that
claims arising out of 'malpractice, error, or mistake' [are] dearly legally dis-
tinguishable from [those] for breach of contract. The legal duty, the breach of
which is covered, is wholly different. If a doctor makes a contract to effect a
cure and fails to do so, he is liable for breach of contract even though he use
the highest possible professional skill.
Id. at 546-47, 127 N.E.2d at 332 (quoting Safian v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 260 A.D. 765, 24
N.Y.S.2d 192 (1939) (citation omitted). See, e.g., Liebler v. Our Lady of Victory Hosp., 43
A.D.2d 898, 351 N.YS.2d 480 (1974); Guilmet v. Campbell, 385 Mich. 57, 188 N.W.2d
601 (1971).
17. C. LANGDELL, SELEcrION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CoNTRAcrs (2d ed. 1879).
18. 0. HOLMEs, THE COMMON LAW (M. Howe ed. 1963).
19. RESTATEMENT OF CONTEaCrs (1932).
1979]
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doctrine to be mastered by "true lawyers." 20 The case method of
study that he introduced at the Harvard Law School was designed
to meet this goal through selection of key appellate decisions
from which the major legal principles could be extracted and
studied.2
Langdell's "science" was later "pieced together by his suc-
cessors-notably Holmes, in broad philosophical outline, and
Williston, in meticulous . . . scholarly detail. ' 22 Holmes said
contracts were "dealings between men, by which they make
arrangements for the future. In making such arrangements, the
important thing is not what is objectively true, but what the
parties know." He believed contract theory should be a collection
of rules creating a body of law that was "formal and external.
' 24
One of the attractions of this theory was that it satisfied a "hunger
for ... national uniformity of . . . commercial law.
' 2
5
The Restatement of Contracts codified Holmes' theory into
a body of rules. The consideration theory,20 incorporated into
20. C. LANGDELL, supra note 17, at vii-ix.
21. Id. at viii-ix. As Dean of the Harvard Law School, Langdell believed that the
law had developed slowly, and that this development could best be mastered by "study-
ing the cases in which (the law) was embodied." Id. at viii. He recognized, however, that
the vast number of decisions were worthless for the purpose of systematic study, making
it necessary to carefully select and arrange the cases that had contributed to the develop-
ment of the law's essential doctrines. Id. at ix. For a discussion of Langdell and the
Harvard Law School, see J. SELIGMAN, THE HIGH CITADEL (1978).
22. G. GsL fOa, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 14 (1974).
23. 0. HOLmES, supra note 18, at 239.
24. Id. at 230. See G. GILMORE supra note 22, at 113 n.41. This phrase was hand-
written by Holmes into his own copy of The Common Law. Holmes believed that con-
tract theory should be objective. For a contract to be enforceable, the formal technical
requirements of formation-offer, acceptance, and capacity-must have been met. Com-
pliance with these requirements should be measured by an external standard, whereby
a court will objectively evaluate the interactions of the parties. The role of the courts
was thus clearly defined.
[They] should operate as detached umpires or referees, doing no more than to
see that the rules of the game were observed and refusing to intervene affirma-
tively to see that justice or anything of that sort was done. Courts do not, it was
said, make contracts for the parties. The parties themselves must see that the
last i is properly dotted, the last t properly crossed; the courts will not do it
for them.
Id. at 15. For an analysis of Holmes' external standards in criminal and tort law, see
Comment, Oliver Wendell Holmes and External Standards of Criminal and Tort Liability:
Application of Theory on the Massachusetts Bench, 28 BUFFALO L. REv. 607 (1979).
25. Gordon, Book Review, 1974 Wisc. L. Rav. 1216, 1234. See also G. GILMOmP, supra
note 22, at 96-97.
26. Consideration for a promise is defined as: "(a) an act other than a promise, or
(b) a forebearance, or (c) the creation, modification or destruction of a legal relation, or
(d) a return promise, bargained for and given in exchange for the promise." RESTATrMENT
OF CONTRAcTs § 75 (1932). See also G. GILMoRE, supra note 22, at 18.
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section 75 of the Restatement, became one of the key principles
of the formal model. The exchange of consideration demonstrated
the parties' intention to enter into a contract. It also enabled
parties to develop expectations from their agreements, and per-
mitted courts to remedy breaches. Without bargained-for considera-
tion, an agreement became something less than a contract, neither
enforceable nor subject to legal sanctions.
Not only did there develop an objective test for the determina-
tion oi whether a contract existed, there also evolved an objective
standard for measuring damages. This approach was designed to
protect the expectations of the contracting parties. Relief from the
breach of an agreement was intended to exact the same cost as
compliance.2 The traditional measure of damages became the
''expectation interest" and its rule required placing the plaintiff
"in as good a position as he would have occupied had the defendant
performed his promise."2 9 The award usually is determined by the
difference between the value of a good or service had the contract
been performed, and its value after the breach, plus any incidental
costs.3 0
The expectation interest was classic in its promotion of the
economic and legal policy objectives of facilitating and encouraging
contract formation. 31 Parties could predict and determine the extent
of their obligations, liabilities, and potential recoveries at the time
of formation.3 2 It was also the easiest remedy to administer, since
promisees did not have to prove detrimental reliance, but only the
27. See REsrATENMNT OF CoNTRAcrs § 75, Comment C. A promise was not legally
enforceable unless it was supported by bargained-for consideration. "The fact that the
promisee relies on the promise to his injury, or the promisor gains some advantage
therefrom, does not establish consideration without the element of bargain or agreed
exchange." Id.
28. See Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of Contract, 70 COLuM. L. REv. 1145,
1147-48 (1970). The purpose of the remedy is to make the cost of nonperformance equal
to the cost of performance, creating an incentive for parties to adhere to their agree-
ments.
29. Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages 1, 46 YAL L.J. 52,
54 (1936).
30. The expectation interest is considered the standard measure of damages in the
commercial setting. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-706; RESTATEMENT OF CONTREArs, § 329 (1932).
31. See Fuller & Perdue, supra note 29, at 57-66.
32. This is a Holmesian view of contract damage theory. See note 24 & accompany-
ing text supra. Holmes believed that parties to a contract should be free to breach their
agreements at will; the remedy for a breach should be no greater than the value of
the nonoccurring promised event. 0. HOLMES, supra note 18, at 236. The expectation
theory is compatible with Holmes' philosophy because it provides the nonbreacher with
the value of the benefit he would have derived from the contract's performance. Hence,
the expectation theory provides the nonbreaching party the largest potential recovery for
the breach of a contract.
1979]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28
value that the breaching party's promise would have created. Thus,
damage theory fosters contract formation and encourages parties to
depend on their agreements.
Illustrative of the application of the classic model to the
medical contract is Hawkins v. McGee.34 In Hawkins, the defendant
physician promised to restore the plaintiff's burned hand to normal.
The defendant performed three operations, but was unable to
heal the hand. Although the jury did not find that the doctor per-
formed his work negligently, it did conclude that he breached the
agreement to fix the hand." On appeal, the New Hampshire
Supreme Court applied a classic Holmesian analysis, calling the
standard by which the doctor's conduct was to be measured
"external." 6 The only compensable damages, therefore, were those
that the "parties must have had in mind when the contract was
made. '37 Hence, the proper measure of damages was the difference
in value between the promised normal hand and the resulting
deformed hand.
Specifically excluded from the recoverable losses in Hawkins
were pain and suffering, which were analogized to a cost of treat-
ment that the patient was expected to bear. Pain was essentially
33. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 29, at 53-54. The expectation interest must be dis-
tinguished from the restitution and reliance theories. The restitution theory protects
the nonbreacher by returning to him any benefit that his performance conferred upon
the breacher. The purpose of the remedy is to prevent the defaulting promisor from
being unjustly enriched. This is achieved by forcing the breaching party to disgorge
his gains from the contract. In contrast, the reliance theory compensates the per-
forming party for expenditures made in anticipation of the breacher's performance.
This usually includes expenditures that are necessary for his compliance with the agree-
ment. See id. at 53-54. Both the restitution and reliance interests attempt to restore
parties to the position they occupied prior to the cofbtractual arrangement. The reliance
award, however, is not limited to the benefit conferred to the breaching party, but often
includes other outlays. For a discussion of these theories in the medical context, see text
accompanying notes 50-57, infra.
In order to receive a reliance damage recovery, the nonbreaching party must be
able to substantiate his subjective dependence on the unperformed agreement. Not only
is the substantiation difficult, but the problems of determining a "pecuniary measure-
ment [of this dependence] are such that the business man knowing, or sensing, that
these obstacles stood in the way of judicial relief would hesitate to rely on a promise
- .. where the legal sanction was of significance to him." Fuller & Perdue, supra note 29
at 62.
34. 84 N.H. 114, 146 A. 641 (1929).
35. The trial court permitted the jury to consider two elements of damage: the
positive ill effects on the plaintiff's hand, and pain and suffering. Id. at 116-17, 146 A.
at 643.
36. Id. at 119, 146 A. at 644. For a discussion of the external standard, see note 24
& accompanying text supra.
37. 84 N.H. at 117, 146 A. at 643 (quoting Davis v. New England Cotton Yarn Co.,
77 N.H. 403, 404, 92 A. 732, 733 (1914)).
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part of the bargain and thus part of the agreed consideration
within the meaning of classic theory. This consideration theory,
the benefit-of-bargain rule, limited the plaintiff's recovery. In the
Hawkins court's view, an award for the promised condition plus
pain and suffering would have amounted to a double recovery.38
Consistent with this perception of the consideration theory, how-
ever, is the one instance that allows the recovery of pain and
suffering where more is endured than was reasonably anticipated
by the treatment. The traditional view treats this added pain as
an excess payment-not part of the bargain-and therefore not
recoverable. Therefore, it "might be found that the plaintiff paid
a higher price for the cure than was agreed. Ordinarily, if to obtain
a promised result one is obliged to pay more than the agreed price,
the excess payment may be recovered as well as the loss in not
obtaining the result."
' 9
II. REACTION TO THE CLASSIC THEORY
The Realist movement, which arose in the early part of this
century, was a critical reaction to legal formalism. In the view of
the Realists, the law's purpose was not to assure only uniform
and consistent doctrine with remedies resulting from an interplay
of technical rules. The Realists believed, rather, that rules should
be carefully framed to serve and reflect desired social behavior."
They were less concerned with doctrinal boundaries than with the
"results of litigation." 41 The Realists maintained that courts should
be freed from the confines of abstract principles, and made aware
of their discretion to "solve problems in accordance with policy
38. See Fuller & Perdue, supra note 29, at 80-84. According to the classic theory, the
total consideration for the medical treatment is the medical fees and attendant ex-
penses, plus the pain and distress that is knowingly endured in order to reach the de-
sired promised condition. Consequently, an award encompassing the value of the promised
condition and pain and suffering would amount to a double recovery. "[A] man cannot
claim the benefits of a bargain [the promised condition] without incurring its detri-
ments [the pain and suffering]." Id. at 81.
39. McQuaid v. Michou, 85 N.H. 229, 304, 157 A. 881, 884 (1932).
40. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 25, at 1220 n.24.
"Realism" must ... be taken broadly as shorthand representing characteris-
tics such as (a) awareness that law serves certain social purposes, (b) concern to
make it serve those purposes better, (c) skepticism about the utility of rules ex-
pressed in conceptual form, and (d) preference for explicit articulation by the
courts of rules in terms of their relationship to the social purposes they are
framed to serve.
Id.
41. Friedman & Macaulay, Contract Law and Contract Teaching: Past, Present, and
Future, 1967 Wisc. L. Rxv. 805, 806.
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goals."42 Karl Llewellyn, an early leader of the Realist movement,
wrote that the substantive rules of law were less important than
many classical contract scholars assumed, and that strict adherence
to formal technical requirements tended to misdirect legal discus-
sion.43 Consequently, the Realists urged that the focal point of
legal thought and training should shift from the study of formal
rules to solutions to actual problems and analysis of social and
legal behavior.44
Application of the benefit-of-bargain rule to medical contracts,
in the Realists' view, is an example of classical thinking gone
awry.45 The desired social outcome from improperly executed
medical services is compensation for all harms flowing from the
injurious act, including compensation for physical and mental pain,
medical costs, and lost earnings.46
Equally important, the Realists believed that legal thinking
suffered when results were forced to fit formal doctrine, often
causing theoretical inconsistencies and unsettling consequences.
7
Even if the classic expectation interest were applicable to medical
contracts, for example, the Realists would assert that it is too
difficult to administer practically. One of the primary functions of
the classical model was to increase predictability of legal inter-
action.48 In most commercial situations, the expectancy remedy is
simple to calculate: the injuries arising from the breach are
pecuniary, and conditions before and after have corresponding
dollar values. Medical contracts, however, do not lend themselves
to simple arithmetic solutions, because the pre- and post-contract
conditions concern human anatomy, which defies precise monetary
valuation. The formalist goal of promoting legal certainty and
42. Id. at 809. Professors Friedman and Macaulay wrote that one of the major
shortcomings of the classical theory was that it sought to turn contract law into an uni-
form and internally consistent body of rules. "Problems were analyzed because they fit
this logical pattern, rather than because they were empirically determined to be socially
or economically significant. Cases were labelled 'correct' mainly if they were consistent
with the logical pattern of contract doctrine." Id. at 806. In contrast to the classic
model, the Realists believed that blindly following rules caused courts to lose sight of
goals that should be pursued.
43. Llewellyn, A Realist Jurisprudence-The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REv. 431, 442-
43 (1930).
44. See generally id.
45. For a discussion of the practical problems of the classical model in the medical
context, see notes 63-64 & accompanying text infra.
46. The classical expectation remedy does not compensate the patient for these in-
juries. See text accompanying notes 34-39 supra.
47. See text accompanying notes 63-73 infra.
48. See text accompanying notes 29-33 supra.
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consistent results, therefore, is inapplicable to medical cases. Any
attempt to impose the precision envisioned by contract law on an
injured patient is doomed to failure in the form of a fictional result.
III. SULLIVAN V. O'CONNOR
A. The Reliance Interest
Strains of Realist thought-particularly criticism of the
Hawkins rationale and traditional damage theory-are evident in
Sullivan v. O'Connor.49 Justice Kaplan, writing for the Massa-
chusetts Supreme Judicial Court, noted that "[s]ome cases have
taken the simple view that the promise by the physician is to be
treated like an ordinary commercial promise, and accordingly that
the successful plaintiff is entitled to a standard measure of recovery
for the breach of contract."50 The Sullivan court, however, con-
sidered the expectancy interest inadequate: while conceptually it
may provide the patient with the greatest recovery, awarding
damages for the value of the performed contract rather than for
pain and mental distress, in practice this does not occur. The
dollar value of the performed contract may in fact be less than the
value of the pain and suffering endured in anticipation of per-
formance and as a result of the breach. Accordingly, Justice Kaplan
concluded that the expectancy measure did not satisfy the plaintiff's
injuries and it was too difficult for the jurors to properly value
the injuries."
The court also considered the restitution interest. The
defendant-doctor had argued that the plaintiff's out-of-pocket costs
49. 363 Mass. at 586, 296 N.E.2d at 188.
50. Id. at 583, 296 N.E.2d at 186. The court referred to the following cases: Cloutier
v. Kasheta, 105 N.H. 262, 197 A.2d 627 (1964) (a physician who fails to provide treat-
ment as promised may be held liable for breach of contract, and traditional contract
principles govern, though in the instant case the plaintiff should have brought the ac-
tion in tort); Lakeman v. LaFrance, 102 N.H. 300, 156 A2d 128 (1959) (see note 6 supra);
McQuaid v. Michou, 85 N.H. 299, 157 A. 881 (1932) (see notes 71-73 & accompanying
text infra); and Hawkins v. McGee, 84 N.H. 114, 146 A. 641 (1929) (see text accompany-
ing notes 84-89 supra).
51. The major problem confronting Justice Kaplan was that monetary values-the
accepted measure of compensation for the breach of a legal duty-bear little or no rela-
tionship to the promised or resulting conditions, nor to the nonpecuniary "costs" of the
contract-pain and suffering. In theory, the expectation interest would be harsh on the
physician who has been absolved of negligence because the doctor would be required
to compensate the patient for the value of a condition that is medically impossible to
obtain. On the other hand, if the physician promised to perform unattainable services,
he should be held accountable to all pecuniary and nonpecuniary costs endured by the
patient in reliance on the agreement. See text accompanying notes 63-70 infra.
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were the maximum extent of his liability, but the court rejected
this view. "For breach of the patient-physician agreements under
consideration, a recovery limited to restitution plainly seems too
meager, if the agreements are to be enforced at all."'5 2 Under the
restitution theory, Sullivan's recovery would have been limited to
the $625 medical expenses, which was the benefit to the doctor
under the contract.
A more equitable measure of damages than either the ex-
pectation or restitution interests, noted Justice Kaplan, was pro-
vided by a series of cases that did not explicitly reject Hawkins51
These cases awarded an "intermediate pattern of recovery"": the
remedies were not limited to a recovery of benefits conferred
on the physician, nor were they similar to those provided by the
difference in value test.5 Justice Kaplan stated that the purpose of
the formulation is to put the patient in the position he occupied
52. 363 Mass. at 585, 296 N.E.2d at 187. For a discussion of the restitution interest,
see note 88 supr-
53. 863 Mass. at 585, 296 N.E.2d at 187. The decisions cited by the court included
the following: Stewart v. Rudner, 849 Mich. 459, 84 N.W.2d 816 (1957) (see notes 80-81
& accompanying text infra); Robins v. Finestone, 308 N.Y. 543, 127 N.E.2d 330 (1955)
(damages for breach of contract do not include compensation for pain and suffering,
but could encompass an award for money spent for post operative treatment and cures);
Colvin v. Smith, 276 A.D. 9, 92 N.Y.S.2d 794 (1949) (damages should be limited to pay-
ments for medical treatment and for nurses and medicines); Frank v. Malinak, 232 A.D.
278, 249 N.Y.S. 514 (1931) (a physician who promised the patient that the operation
would not leave any external scars was liable for the medical costs and for the disfigure-
ment caused by the external incisions); and Frankel v. Wolper, 181 A.D. 485, 169 N.Y.S.
15 (1918) (a physician who did not achieve the promised results could not be held liable
for the resulting pain and distress, but could be required to compensate the patient for
medicines, expenses, and appliances used in the cure).
54. 363 Mass. at 585, 296 N.E.2d at 187.
55. Id. The court called this "intermediate pattern of recovery" a reliance measure
of damages. Those cases cited by the court to support its adoption of this theory, how-
ever, did not compensate the patients for the detriment of pain and suffering. See note
53 supra. Thus, the term "reliance" is only partially descriptive of the actual award of
damages. Perhaps these awards should be called "restitution-plus" recoveries because an
award for pain and suffering would be necessary to fully return the patients to the posi-
tions they had occupied before the breach of the medical contract. Stewart may be con-
sidered an exception because the patient did receive an award for her distress. The case,
however, cannot be called a reliance decision because the Michigan Supreme Court ap-
plied an expectancy remedy, but permitted the unusual recovery only because of the
foreseeability of the injury. See notes 80-81 & accompanying text infra. Justice Kaplan
later admitted that there were no reliance cases to support full application of the re-
liance interest to medical contract cases:
There is much to be said, then, for applying a reliance measure to the present
facts, and we have only to add that our cases are not unreceptive to the use of
that formula in special situations. We have, however, had no previous occasions
to apply it to patient-physician cases.
363 Mass. at 586, 296 N.E.2d at 188.
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before the parties entered the contractual arrangement, which is
to "compensate [her] for the detriments she suffered in reliance
upon the agreement."5 The court recognized the similarity of the
intermediate measure of damages to a suggestion made by Lon
Fuller and William Perdue in The Reliance Interest in Contract
Damages.57 Under this formulation, Sullivan's award would have
encompassed all costs and injuries endured as a consequence of the
treatment: pain and suffering from all three operations, compensa-
tion for the worsening of the condition, out-of-pocket costs, and
lost earnings if applicable."'
Although none of the previous reliance cases awarded damages
for pain and suffering,5 9 Justice Kaplan held that the same rationale
that permitted the recovery of some expenditures made in reliance
on the doctor's performance-expenses for medicines and nurses-
permitted his court to compensate Sullivan for all expenditures
incurred as a result of treatment. There was no reason, he added,
to limit the recovery to monetary expenditures, since the suffering
and mental distress would not have been endured by the patient
had the parties not entered into the contractual arrangement.6 0
Consequently, all of the patient's costs in the course of treatment-
pecuniary and psychological-were compensable so that the patient
could be restored to the status quo. 1
B. The Significance of Sullivan
The Sullivan court's refusal to follow the strict expectancy
damage formula, and its adoption of the reliance theory may be a
step toward developing a more flexible body of civil obligation law.
In the opinion of many commentators, tort and contract law should
not be viewed separately, but should be considered one category
of law.62 To the extent that Justice Kaplan sought to tailor the
56. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 29.
57. Id. at 54. By placing the nonbreacher in the same position he occupied prior to
the contractual relationship, this remedy has the effect of undoing harms resulting from
the promisee's belief that the promisor would perform.
58. 363 Mass. at 588, 296 N.E.2d at 189.
59. See notes 54-56 supra.
60. 363 Mass. at 588, 296 N.E.2d at 189.
61. Id.
62. See, e.g., G. GILmORE, supra note 22; Friedman & Macaulay, supra note 41;
O'Connell, The Interlocking Death and Rebirth of Contract and Tort, 75 MIcH. L. REv.
659 (1977). Professor Gilmore wrote that the formal contract model is dying, and being
"reabsorbed into the mainstream of 'tort'." G. GILMoRE, supra note 22, at 87. According
to Gilmore's thesis, courts no longer demand strict compliance with technical rules be-
fore they will hold a party liable for breaching an agreement. Gilmore illustrates this
1979]
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damage theory to provide the plaintiff with a socially desirable
remedy, Sullivan v. O'Connor can be considered a contemporary
Realist decision. Working within contract doctrine, yet without
slavish adherence to its rules, the court identified the problem of
the classical theory, and then provided relief unhampered by those
shortcomings.
As the court recognized in Sullivan, the standard expectation
theory, which treats a medical contract at breach as if it were an
ordinary commercial contract, does not protect the expectations
with which the physician-patient relationship was formed. Typical
is the Hawkins formulation: "the present case is closely analogous
to one in which a machine is built for a certain purpose and war-
ranted to do certain work. In such cases, the usual rule of damages
for breach of warranty in the sale of chattels is applied."' 3 Accord-
ingly, the expectation interest presented two problems: the relief
would not correspond to the patient's perception of the injuries;
and it would be difficult for the jury to value those injuries.04
Victims of improperly performed medical procedures gen-
erally view their injuries as both "money and time wasted in
medical expenditures.., and mental anguish and disappointment
attendant upon the lack of cure," with the latter element as the
predominant harm.65 Of course, these injuries are compensable by
the damages allowed in a traditional tort action.0 Classic contract
theory, on the other hand, compensates plaintiffs for the value of
the unrealized physical condition, and, by operation of the benefit-
of-bargain rule, excludes the costs incurred in attempting to achieve
that condition-pain and suffering. 7 The anticipated lost income
envisioned by this formula never materializes in the medical con-
tract, but rather is replaced by the out-of-pocket expense of pain
and suffering. It is therefore absurd to apply a commercial, eco-
trend in his discussion of the development of promissory estoppel and products liability.
Professors Friedman and Macaulay stated that formal rules and technical requirements
are being replaced by analysis geared to problem solving, and that modem contract doc-
trine must be designed to foster and perpetuate informal and ongoing relationships,
rather than to force strict adherence to technical rules. Professor O'Connell, in a review
of THE DEATH OF CoNrgAcr, concluded that contracts and torts are dying for opposite
reasons: contracts tried to be too orderly and thus became unjust while torts tried to be
just but became too disorderly. See O'Connell supra, at 685.
63. 84 N.H. at 117, 146 A. at 643.
64. See generally Miller, supra note 1, at 423-35.
65. Id. at 426. Miller added "although the liability rests on breach of contract, the
essential harm done is manifested in injury and mental suffering." Id. at 424. For a dis.
cussion of Sullivan's perception of her injury, see note 70 infra.
66. See Miller, supra note 1, at 424.
67. For a discussion of the benefit-of-bargain rule, see notes 38-39 & accompanying
text supra.
[Vol. 28
CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY OF PHYSICIANS
nomically based theory that ignores the patient's perceived injury
while remedying one not felt.6 8 In practice, the reliance award is
identical to a malpractice tort recovery; both provide the same
elements of recoverable damage. Justice Kaplan recognized the
similarities between the damage recoveries of the two theories:
Recovery on a reliance basis for breach of the physician's promise
tends to equate with the usual recovery for malpractice, since the
latter also looks in general to restoration of the condition before
the injury. But this is not paradoxical when it is noted that the
origins of contract lie in tort. 9
The Sullivan court's adoption of the reliance theory made up for
the path not chosen in litigation; it comported with the plaintiff's
perception of the injury,70 and with the social policy of providing
recoveries for needless pain and suffering resulting from the non-
performance of promised medical services.
The court's refusal to apply the expectation interest's differ-
ence in value formula also resulted from a realistic appraisal of its
inability to fairly award damages for the patient's nonpecuniary
injuries. Justice Kaplan recognized that the expectation theory may
be workable when the breach is commercially oriented, but thought
it was unmanageable in a medical case.71 Not only would the trier of
fact have to estimate the value of the promised condition, but the
benefit-of-bargain rule would also require it to separate bargained-
68. Miller, supra note 1, at 424. Miller said the expectation interest is primarily
geared towards commercial and mercantile contract settings.
Where the plaintiff would have gained an anticipated profit but for the breach
by the defendant of his contractual obligation, it is readily understood why the
defendant should be required to put the plaintiff in as good a position as he
would have been had the promise been kept. This is the so-called "benefit-of-
bargain" rule. However, this rationale can hardly be said to apply to
[medical contract] cases.
69. 363 Mass. at 588, 296 N.E.2d at 188 n.6. The parallel between a reliance award
and traditional malpractice is exemplified by Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386
N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978). In Becker, the defendant physician failed to test the
plaintiff's unborn child for Down's Syndrome. The baby was born suffering from mon-
goloidism and the physician was found to be negligent. The court applied a standard
malpractice recovery, stating that the remedy is designed to "place the [injured] party
in the position he would have occupied but for the negligence of the defendant." Id. at
411, 886 N.E.2d at 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 900. The reliance recovery is virtually indis-
tinguishable because it places the plaintiff in "as good a position he was in before the
promise was made." Fuller & Perdue, supra note 29, at 54.
70. R. DANZIG, THE CAPABILrTY PROBLEM IN CONTRACr LAW 25-27 (1978). Sullivan
was less concerned with the doctor's failure to achieve the promised condition than with
the enormous amounts of pain and suffering she endured as a result of the treatment.
71. 363 Mass. at 586, 296 N.E.2d at 188. See also Fuller & Perdue, supra note 29, at
374-86.
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for from unbargained-for pain.72 One court had attempted to apply
the consideration theory to the medical contract, but realized that
in practice it was impossible to apply.
The suffering as a whole is incapable of division into the suggested
groupings for the purpose of any satisfactory and reasonable di-
vision of allowance. The parts are so interconnected that the suffer-
ing of [the] condition is essentially a continuance of the suffering
of treatment with the boundary line too difficult to be fairly as-
certained.73
In addition to demonstrating the practical significance of the
reliance interest, the Sullivan decision exhibits the kind of judicial
response envisioned by the Realists, based not on black letter rules,
but on social desirability. For example, one important difference
between the expectancy and the reliance theories is that the expec-
tation award remains constant, regardless of the injured party's
expenditures during performance, while the reliance recovery
varies with that party's dependence on the defendant's perform-
ance.74 Pain and suffering cannot be made objective; like the re-
72. Id. at 586, 296 N.E.2d at 188. Justice Kaplan said that attempting to put a dollar
value on the formulation would put an "exceptional strain on the imagination of the
factfinder." Id. at 586, 296 N.E.2d at 188.
Moreover, in some situations the expectancy theory may be conceptually impossible
to apply. In Doerr v. Villate, 74 II1. App. 2d 332, 220 N.E.2d 767 (1966), the plaintiff
was the mother of two retarded children. The defendant physician performed a vasec-
tomy on the plaintiff's husband, and promised that he would be unable to father any
more children. In spite of the guarantee, the plaintiff became pregnant and gave birth
to a third retarded child. The court sustained the contract cause of action and remanded
the case to trial for damages. While the court was not faced with a choice of which
contract damage theory to apply, the case nevertheless illustrates the problems of ex-
pectation interest in the medical setting. The difference in value-the value of having
no child versus the value of having a retarded child-bears little relationship to the
plaintiff's injuries and is impossible to determine. Thus, it is an ineffectual remedy.
The reliance interest, however, would provide a remedy patterned after recent tort
wrongful conception cases-permitting a recovery for the cost of raising a retarded child.
See, e.g., Comment, Wrongful Life and A Fundamental Right To Be Born Healthy: Park
v. Chessin; Becker v. Schwartz, 27 BUFFALO L. REv. 537 (1978).
73. McQuaid v. Michou, 85 N.H. 299, 304, 157 A. 881, 884 (1932). The defendant
promised to cure the plaintiff through a series of injections that was supposed to last
five weeks. The treatment had to be stopped prematurely when the patient could not
bear the pain. The New Hampshire Supreme Court applied a strict consideration theory,
noting that pain and suffering was not compensable because it was part of the price
the patient was willing to pay for the promised cure. The court, however, permitted a
partial recovery for the suffering because more was endured than was reasonably ex-
pected. Id. at 303-04, 157 A. at 884.
74. See Fuller & Perdue, supra note 29, at 61. Under the reliance theory, the more
the nonbreacher relied on the promisor's performance, incurring expenses based on the
contract, the greater the potential recovery. Hence, more is required to return the non.
breacher to the pre-contract position. In contrast, the expectation interest measures
damages based on a party's objective potential for gain from the agreement. The reliance
award, therefore, provides a more personally tailored recovery that corresponds to dam.
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liance award, it varies with each patient and injury. Hence, the
reliance interest not only provides a remedy that is easier to
administer, given the nature of the breach and resulting harms, but
also closely resembles the characteristics of the injury itself.
The court's willingness to award damages for pain and suffer-
ing is still another instance of its desire to design a remedy con-
sistent with the plaintiff's view of the injury, rather than to adhere
to the technical requirements of the classic model. According to
the Restatement of Contracts, damages for mental distress are
usually not compensable unless the breach results from reckless or
wanton behavior, and the defendant knew, or had reason to know,
that mental suffering was likely to result from nonperformance of
the contract.75 The underlying rationale of the Restatement was
that parties to a contract expect to derive financial gain: while it is
foreseeable that they may incur economic losses, it is not expected
that they will suffer psychological injuries. Thus, non-pecuniary
damages are considered too remote, and not within the contempla-
tion of the parties. The Realists, however, would call the applica-
tion of the Restatement a paper rule: "the accepted doctrine of the
time and place-what the book says the 'law is',.'7 It acts as an
artificial barrier to a proper result. The Restatement recognizes
that not all contracts are commercial in nature and that in some
cases damages for mental suffering are permitted.77 Yet, strict ad-
herence to the Restatement has resulted generally in denial of
awards for pain and suffering.7 The Sullivan court did not find
age actually suffered by the nonbreacher, and is particularly appropriate in the medical
setting because of the nature of resulting injuries. For a further comparison of the
two theories, see note 33 supra.
75. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS, § 341 (1932):
In actions for breach of contract, damages will not be given as compensation
for mental suffering, except where the breach was wanton or reckless and caused
bodily harm and where it was the wanton or reckless breach of a contract to
render a performance of such a character that the defendant had reason to know
when the contract was made that the breach would cause mental suffering for
reasons other than mere pecuniary loss.
76. Llewellyn, supra note 43, at 448.
77. RSTATEMENT oF CONTRAMcTs, § 341, Comment a (1932). "The most common con-
tracts of this kind are engagements to marry, contracts of carriers and innkeepers with
passengers and guests, and contracts for the carriage or proper disposition of dead bodies,
and contracts for the delivery of death messages." Id.
78. See, e.g., Robins v. Finestone, 308 N.Y. 543, 127 N.E.2d 330 (1955); Hirsch v.
Safian, 257 A.D. 212, 12 N.Y.S.2d 568 (1939); Conklin v. Draper, 229 A.D. 227, 241 N.Y.S.
529 (1930). These cases illustrate the clear line distinguishing contract from tort actions.
Courts have narrowly defined the limits of recoverable damages in contract, permitting
them up to the point where the patient seeks an award for pain and suffering. In Robins,
for example, the New York Court of Appeals noted that the gist of the action was the
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this reasoning persuasive, 79 and instead construed the rule narrow-
ly, citing Stewart v. Rudner,0 which declared that the general
damage principles were applicable only to commercial contracts.
"[N]ot all contracts are purely commercial in ...nature. Some
involve rights we cherish, dignities we respect, emotions recognized
by all as both sacred and personal. In such cases the award of dam-
ages for mental distress and suffering is commonplace, even in
actions ex contractu."'
Although Justice Kaplan may have in fact overstated the
frequency of medical contracts and awards for mental distress, his
point is still well taken. It is arguable that the court reached a
"socially desirable" result; but any attempt to reach a "socially
desirable" result will necessarily engender difficulties, since it is
rare for any available choice to be meritless. Yet, it is the willing-
ness of the court to enter into such a decision-making process
that is important. How to choose is never easy, but deciding to
make a choice is the first hurdle. Thus once the court chose to
reject the facility of the classical model, it faced the difficult ques-
tion of what is socially desirable when a patient is "promised" a
result by a physician. And, if courts are willing to find contracts
in relationships like those between patients and physicians, perhaps
based on psychological and sociological considerations, what of the
promisors? Essentially, the question is asked and answered by say-
ing that we want a socially desirable result, which seems to be the
basis of civil obligation law. In Sullivan, the court was content to
define social desirability by treating the medical promise in the
manner in which most medical actions are treated, rather than
as a separate basis of liability, caused perhaps by an aberration of
proof. Now that at least one court has decided to reach this ques-
tion, it may be time for other courts to proffer answers.
failure of the physician to perform a promise. Hence pain and suffering was outside
the scope of the recovery:
Nowhere in the complaint is there any statement that the plaintiff seeks to re-
cover for his pain and suffering, which would be a relevant and material alle-
gation if it were an action in malpractice. The damages sought are those suited
to an action on contract, and help to characterize the complaint as one based
upon a contract and not one based upon malpractice and negligence.
308 N.Y. at 547, 127 N.E.2d at 332. In cases where damages for pain and suffering were
requested, courts usually classified the complaint as malpractice and applied the tort
statute of limitation. See notes 4-6 supra.
79. 363 Mass. at 587, 296 N.E.2d at 188-89.
80. 349 Mich. 459, 84 N.W.2d 816 (1957). The plaintiff contracted with the defendant
to deliver her child by caesarian section. When the physician failed to perform the
operation, the child was stillborn, causing the mother to suffer severe emotional distress.
81. Id. at 469, 84 N.W.2d at 823.
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CONCLUSION
Sullivan v. O'Connor is a departure from the traditional
manner in which courts have resolved medical contract cases. The
court indicated a preference for the reliance theory rather than the
classic expectation interest, and implicitly stressed the dangers of
blindly following a rule of law without first critically evaluating its
purpose.
A narrow reading of Sullivan is that tort remedies may be
obtained as a consequence of a contract breach by the use of the
reliance theory. Yet Sullivan permits more than a tort recovery in
contract; it also advances the tort notion of allocation of loss accord-
ing to fault. One of the key distinctions between tort and contract
has been that tort liability results from social convention or public
policy, while contractual liability arises out of mutual agree-
ment.2 Sullivan blurs that distinction. Once a duty has been estab-
lished and breached, courts ought to apply the most meaningful
remedy, rather than force their analysis to fit the requirements of
a tort or contract label. Sullivan suggests that there is no reason to
follow the divisions between the "compartments of the law."' ,
Originally, contract liability of physicians developed to circumvent
the technical requirements of medical malpractice: Sullivan com-
pletes the circle by importing into the contract remedy the tort
recovery. And Gilmore's point is raised again: the classical Holmes-
Williston theory began to break down at its inception.8 Since the
Restatement of Contracts, courts and statutes have whittled away at
the classic structure, until torts and contracts have begun to merge
into a single theory of civil obligation law.85 The Death of Contract,
wrote Robert Gordon, demonstrates the inadequacies of the classic
theory, long a "central preoccupation of the Case-Law Realists."8 "
Sullivan illustrates Gilmore's thesis. Not only does it present the
difficulties of the classic theory, it also seeks to implement a socially
desirable remedy by blending the concepts of tort and contract law
into one homogenous theory.
DAvm N. WYNN
82. See generally O'Connell, supra note 62.
83. See Fuller, Book Review, 18 N.C.L. Rav. 1, 2 (1939). Professor Fuller criticized
Williston's text for failing to account for cases on the "periphery of contract law." Id.
84. See G. GILMoRE, supra note 22. For a discussion of Gilmore's thesis, see note
62 supra.
85. See Gordon, supra note 25, at 1217-18.
86. Id. at 1221.
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